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ABSTRACT 
 
The Place of Theology in a World Come of Age: 
A Comparative Analysis of the Writings of  
Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Paul Ramsey 
 
by 
Dave Buckner 
 
As the twentieth century dawned in the western world, there were 
voices both inside and out of the Christian Church that began to 
question religion’s central place in man’s daily life. Had humanity 
finally progressed to the point where religion was no longer necessary? 
Had we at long last developed the characteristics and perspectives that 
religion had attempted to engrain within us? Or were the rules and 
regulations of religion still needed to ensure the continued 
advancement of civilization? This is a study of two opposing voices in 
that debate: theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer and ethicist Paul Ramsey. 
What follows is my attempt to examine, explain, and expound upon 
the philosophies of both men in an endeavor to more fully understand 
their perspectives and the implications each has for civilization and 
religion as we move now firmly into the twenty-first century and 
beyond.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis examines the modernization of theology during the 
twentieth century as evidenced by the writings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
and Paul Ramsey. I begin the essay with a brief examination of each 
man’s life, including major theological and philosophical influences as 
well as a summary and description of major works. The heart of the 
essay, however, consists of a comparative analysis between Ramsey’s 
and Bonhoeffer’s theologies as witnessed in three primary areas of 
concern.  
First, I examine the secularization, either real or imagined, of 
society in general during the twentieth century as envisioned by both 
men. For Bonhoeffer, the Church is simply “Christ existing as 
community,” and therefore not subject to the restrictions placed upon 
it by any particular denomination. Thus, his concept of Religionless 
Christianity does not mean Christianity without God as it has so often 
been interpreted but rather Christianity without the divisions of 
sectarian theology. That being said, Bonhoeffer does not discount the 
significance of sociology in his theological studies but rather believes 
that a dialogue between the two would help the Christian community 
better understand its proper place in the world. Ramsey, on the other 
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hand, believes that it is this secularization that is responsible for the 
decline of moral thought and action in the twentieth century. He, 
instead, argues for a return to religious tradition and strict ethical 
constructs as a means of establishing governing rules and principles by 
which the Christian may live morally in an increasingly immoral world. 
Second, I revisit the issue of “just war,” as both men dedicated 
sizable time and attention to the matter. Although Bonhoeffer began 
his scholarly career as something of an adherent to the tenets of 
pacifism, his exposure to the many atrocities committed in the Second 
World War quickly forced to him to change his position to one of 
“active resistance,” ultimately even leading him to participate (albeit 
passively) in an assassination attempt on Hitler. Ramsey, although 
also a proponent of “justifiable force” in the face of injustice, is quick 
to criticize Bonhoeffer for his use of situational ethics in his decision-
making process (see below). Ramsey does spend a great amount of 
time discussing the limits of warfare in the Christian ethic as well as 
attempts to establish doctrines for the conducting of “just war” in the 
age of nuclear and insurgent warfare. 
Finally, I examine the aforementioned use of situational ethics, 
of which Bonhoeffer availed himself and Ramsey staunchly criticized. It 
would be unfair to criticize Bonhoeffer for his failure to organize 
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formally many of his theological constructs into one overarching 
system, given his tragic and untimely demise at the hands of the 
Nazis. However, despite Ramsey’s claim that Bonhoeffer is a strict 
“situationalist,” upon closer inspection, the beginnings of a systematic 
theology can be ascertained. Unlike Bonhoeffer, who died at the age of 
thirty-nine, Paul Ramsey was afforded the gift of time in his 
intellectual studies (living to the age of 75). Although Ramsey himself 
has been criticized by subsequent scholars of the same 
“situationalism” of which he once accused Bonhoeffer, his ideas on 
ethical principles and justifiable warfare are considerably more 
developed than Bonhoeffer’s. And, despite some changes in his 
thought as he matured, Ramsey established a preliminary set of moral 
guidelines for right Christian thought and action in the Modern Age. 
This fact notwithstanding, all of his theological writings, even his “just 
war” concepts, center on the theory of “selfless Christian love.” 
I conclude the essay with a brief analysis of what I have learned 
about the theologies of each man as a result of my studies and offer 
my own (humble) opinions about the direction of theology in the 
twenty-first century in the light of their contributions. My ultimate aim 
is to demonstrate that while Bonhoeffer and Ramsey tend to represent 
opposite ends of the theological spectrum, they in fact do have much 
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in common. By doing so, I hope to reveal that what is needed in 
theology today is not the strict adherence to any one particular 
religious doctrine, but rather a blended approach that combines the 
strengths of each while not being limited by the prejudices and 
shortsightedness of either.   
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CHAPTER 2 
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER: HIS LIFE AND WORKS 
 
“It is the nature, and the advantage, of strong people that they 
can bring out the crucial questions and form a clear opinion about 
them. The weak always have to decide between alternatives that are 
not their own.”1
Unfortunately, the majority of public knowledge concerning 
Bonhoeffer’s theology has been limited to such fragmentary phrases as 
“Religionless Christianity” and “Costly Discipleship.” While these basic 
concepts are essential to understanding his overarching theological 
construct, many of these “catchwords” have been intentionally 
 These are the words of twentieth century German 
theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer. A witness to both World Wars, the rise 
and fall of Nazism, and the great schism of the German Christian 
Church under the Third Reich, Bonhoeffer spent the majority of his life 
attempting to understand the world in which he lived and struggling to 
find his place within it. Though his life ended tragically at the age of 
thirty-nine, his works have endured and have continued to exert a 
profound influence on the development of Christian theology and 
ecclesiastical history in the years since his death.  
                                                          
1 Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Available from the Quoteworld website. 
http://www.quoteworld.org/authors/dietrich_bonhoeffer Accessed 30 November, 2007.  
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misrepresented or simply misunderstood, taken completely out of the 
context and spirit in which they were written. As a result, they are 
wholly insufficient in describing Bonhoeffer’s complex and sometimes 
seemingly paradoxical theological precepts in any meaningful way. 
Like St. Augustine, whose majority of theological writings were 
composed in direct response to the Visigoths’ sack of Christian Rome 
in 410 A.D., so too were Bonhoeffer’s writings influenced by and in 
reaction to the historical events of which he was a part. Therefore, 
before an intelligent discussion of Bonhoeffer’s theology can begin, one 
must first attempt to understand the world in which he lived and the 
challenges he faced both as a man and as a Christian.  
Dietrich Bonhoeffer was born in Breslau, Germany, on February 
4, 1906. His father, Karl, was a distinguished physician in the fields of 
psychiatry and neurology. His mother, Paula von Hase, was the 
daughter of a chaplain at the Emperor’s court and the granddaughter 
of famous religious historian Karl von Hase.2
                                                          
2 Rene Marle, Bonhoeffer: The Man and his Work (New York: Newman Press, 1967), 13.  
 When Bonhoeffer was six 
years old, his father was offered a professorship in the Department of 
Psychiatry at the University of Berlin. Upon his acceptance of the 
University’s offer, Karl Bonhoeffer relocated his family, including young 
Dietrich and his seven siblings, to the district of Grunewald in Berlin, a 
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community comprised primarily of faculty members from the 
University.3
These new surroundings provided young Dietrich with access to 
some of the country’s finest academic minds, some of “the most 
distinguished exponents of German culture.”
  
4 During the remainder of 
his formative years, Bonhoeffer immersed himself in this new 
environment, attending musical evenings and participating in 
intellectual discussions with some of most respected professors from 
the University, including renowned ecclesiastical historian Adolf von 
Harnack, theologian Ernst Troeltsch, as well as Ferdinand Tonnies, and 
Max and Alfred Weber.5 By almost all accounts, his familial status 
made him an aristocrat by birth, but Dietrich’s decision to avail himself 
of the many resources both culturally and intellectually afforded him to 
such an extent that many of his friends came to describe Bonhoeffer 
as “representative of an aristocracy of the mind, in the best sense of 
the word.”6
                                                          
3 Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Man of Vision, Man of Courage, Edwin 
Robertson, ed. (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970), 10.  
4 Marle, Bonhoeffer: The Man and his Work, 13.   
  
5 Dallas M. Roark, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Available from the Religion Online website. 
http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=2737&C=2484 Accessed 19 March, 2007.  
6 Marle, Bonhoeffer: The Man and His Work, 14.  
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By the time he had reached adolescence, it was apparent to both 
family and friends that Dietrich would pursue a career in academic 
study, though an exact field was yet to be determined. When he was 
sixteen, Bonhoeffer decided that he wished to become a minister, a 
decision that made little impact upon his parents and drew criticism 
from several of his siblings.7 Undeterred, he enrolled in Tubingen 
University to begin his studies in theology. It was while at Tubingen 
that young Dietrich was introduced formally to the study of modern 
philosophy.8 Though Tubingen provided Bonhoeffer with the 
foundation of his formal education, he remained for only two 
semesters of study. In 1924, he returned to Berlin and enrolled in the 
University to study under such men as Harnack, Deissmann, and H. 
Lietzmann.9 Although it was Harnack who first recognized his potential 
for greatness in the field of ecclesiastical history, Dietrich was more 
drawn to systematic theology and chose instead to study under K. Holl 
and R. Seesburg, two of the University’s leading professors in the 
newly revived field of Lutheran studies.10
                                                          
7 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 22.  
8 Marle, Bonhoeffer: The Man and His Work, 19.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid.   
 It was Seesburg with whom 
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Bonhoeffer most closely identified and under whose tutelage he 
pursued his “licentiate of theology, a degree comparable to the doctor 
of theology.”11 It was also during this time that Bonhoeffer became 
familiar with the published works of Karl Barth, a Christian theologian 
whose ideology closely resembled his own, though not without some 
variations, of course. In 1927, upon the completion and defense of his 
doctoral dissertation, Sanctorum Communio, Dietrich left the 
University in order to take a position as curate in a German parish in 
Barcelona, Spain.12
In 1930, after having successfully defended his thesis, Act and 
Being: Transcendental philosophy and ontology in systematic theology, 
Bonhoeffer was offered a full-time position in the department of 
theology. However, before he began his work, Bonhoeffer decided 
upon continuing his education once more, this time in America at the 
Union Theological Seminary in New York City.
 After holding the position for little more than a 
year, Dietrich returned to Berlin to begin work on his inaugural 
dissertation, a prerequisite to obtaining a full professorship at the 
University.  
13
                                                          
11 Roark, Dietrich Bonhoeffer.  
12 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 57-58.  
 Although the 
13 Roark, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. 
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educational training afforded him while in New York was by no means 
inconsequential to his continuing development, overall, Bonhoeffer was 
rather unimpressed with American theological trends and chose 
instead to focus his attention and energy in other areas. It was his 
experiences outside the classroom that were to have the most lasting 
impact on his character and subsequent theological works. During his 
stay in America, Bonhoeffer immersed himself in a society, indeed an 
entire culture vastly different from his own. Although intrigued by 
many different facets of American society, Dietrich found himself 
especially drawn to the issues of religion and race, which is not at all 
surprising considering his educational background as well as the 
current tumultuous social climate in his native Germany.14
Upon his return to Europe, Bonhoeffer traveled to Bonn to meet 
his mentor in absentia, Karl Barth. He would later comment that his 
only regret for the trip was that it had not been sooner.
  
15
                                                          
14 Marle, Bonhoeffer: The Man and his Work, 21. 
15 Roark, Dietrich Bonhoeffer.  
 This initial 
encounter provided the foundation on which the two men would build a 
steadfast friendship in the years to come. Although Bonhoeffer’s 
theology owed much to Barth, it would be incorrect to categorize his 
theological premises as strictly Barthian. Unlike so many of Barth’s 
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students and admirers, Bonhoeffer had never been afraid to question 
his teachers or to criticize their ideologies when he deemed them 
unqualified or lacking in some regard.16
After his initial visit with Barth, Bonhoeffer returned to Berlin in 
1931 to begin his lecturing tenure at the University. During the 
ensuing year, Dietrich spent the majority of his free time tutoring a 
group of adolescents in nearby Wedding, a working-class 
neighborhood not far from his own.
 Though the two men 
disagreed on numerous occasions, their ability to maintain an open-
minded and unpretentious dialogue only served to strengthen their 
friendship and admiration for one another. In fact, in the years to 
come when Bonhoeffer would face his greatest challenges, it was his 
friendship with Barth that would bring stability and clarity of thought 
to his life in an otherwise chaotic time.  
17
                                                          
16 E. H. Robertson, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1966), 4. 
17 Marle, Bonhoeffer: The Man and his Work, 21.  
 This experience provided him 
with his first real exposure to the trials and tribulations of the German 
lower class. His observance of their living conditions both appalled him 
and inspired him to make a difference. Although his predecessors had 
proven uncomfortable and ultimately unsuccessful in this situation, 
under Bonhoeffer, the children flourished both academically and 
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socially. In addition to tutoring them in their studies, Dietrich 
organized and participated in numerous social and recreational events, 
even taking the majority of his meals with his students, followed by 
evening Bible study. Over time, this interaction not only began to 
foster a strong sense of community amongst his students but also to 
influence his own views on catechism and the true nature and purpose 
of the Christian Church, which was to occupy the majority of his 
thought for the remainder of his life.  
Although his experiences in Wedding proved very influential to 
Bonhoeffer’s still-developing ideology, perhaps an even greater factor 
in his intellectual and theological development presented itself in the 
political and social dilemmas facing Germany in the early 1930s. When 
Bonhoeffer had left Germany for America, the National Socialist (or 
Nazi) Party had been an insignificant player in German politics, but 
upon his return less than a year later, it had emerged as the single 
largest party in the country.18
                                                          
18 Robertson, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 6.  
 The reason for the party’s meteoric rise 
from relative obscurity to the pinnacle of the German political system 
was directly related to the economic depression that was currently 
ravaging Europe and most of the rest of the world in the early 1930s. 
As unemployment rates in Germany continued to increase, public 
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morale and support for the current national government began to 
wane. The opportunistic Nazi Party took full advantage of the situation, 
promising governmental and social reforms and the subsequent 
recovery of the German economy should the populace vote them into 
a position of authority. Viewed by many Germans as stronger and 
more capable than their Bolshevik opposition, the Nazis won election 
easily in 1932 and began to implement their reforms.19 The Nazi Party 
desperately sought the approval and support of the German Church in 
its quest to restore the nation to its former greatness. Whether enticed 
by its rhetoric or simply afraid of Bolshevik rule, many German 
clergymen pledged their support to the Nazi Party. However, 
Bonhoeffer and several other prominent churchmen viewed Hitler’s 
proposed reforms as a “definite interference with the church and a 
molding of its theology.” 20
                                                          
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid., 7.  
 As a result, they refused to support the 
Nazi Party and forced a schism in the German Church. Those who 
remained loyal to the Nazi Party became known as the German 
Christians, while Bonhoeffer and those who supported the church’s 
need for dogmatic and theological independence from the political 
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process became members of what was to be known as the Confessing 
Church.21
Bonhoeffer quickly made his criticisms of the German Christians 
known, even before Adolf Hitler had been officially appointed High 
Chancellor of Germany. Finding fault with Hitler’s attempt to install a 
national bishop to lead the church as well as with his now infamous 
“Aryan clauses” that promoted an ethnic cleansing of both Church and 
State, Bonhoeffer led the resistance to the Nazis and their German 
Christian supporters.
  
22 Although his initial radio broadcast was 
shutdown mid-speech, Bonhoeffer continued to organize resistance 
against the German Christians, all the while attempting to garner 
support for the Confessing Church within the worldwide ecumenical 
movement. To that end, he took a temporary leave of absence from 
his duties at the University in order to accept a ministerial position for 
two German-speaking congregations in London.23
                                                          
21 Ibid.  
22 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 173-174.  
23 Marle, Bonhoeffer: The Man and his Work, 22-25.  
 Since his first verbal 
assault against Hitler and the Nazi regime, Bonhoeffer had been 
closely monitored and his communications habitually censored. 
Although his friend and mentor Karl Barth strongly and publicly 
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objected to Bonhoeffer’s decision to leave Germany when his presence 
was needed most, Bonhoeffer felt that he could achieve far more for 
the Confessing Church outside of Germany, where he still had the 
freedom to speak his mind and associate with whomever he chose.24
Taking full advantage of this lack of restrictions, Bonhoeffer met 
with various members of the ecumenical movement, including the 
Bishop of Chichester, George Bell, and even attended the World 
Alliance of Churches meeting held in Fano, Denmark. When the 
conference was first convened, Germany was represented only by the 
German Christian sect, but through his many friendships in the 
ecumenical movement, Bonhoeffer was able to convince the Alliance to 
withdraw its support from the German Christians and instead align 
themselves with the Confessing Church. Despite all his 
accomplishments while traveling abroad, Bonhoeffer heeded the call of 
the Confessing Church for him to return to Germany to oversee the 
operations of the church’s now illegal seminary for the training of new 
clerics. With Bonhoeffer at the helm, this new seminary in Finkenwalde 
quickly became the unofficial headquarters of the Confessing Church 
until the Nazis closed its doors in late 1937.
  
25
                                                          
24 Ibid.   
 Though always a 
25 Robertson, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 8.  
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proponent of the ecumenical movement, Bonhoeffer had never been 
able to satisfy himself with their utter lack of theology. In an effort to 
remedy this shortcoming, Bonhoeffer used his position within the 
school to begin formulating a new theological foundation from which to 
launch his assault upon the German Christian Church. Arguing against 
such concepts as “cheap grace,” Bonhoeffer instead petitioned his 
parish to practice “costly discipleship for Jesus Christ.”26 Although he 
did not believe that God called all of his disciples to martyrdom, 
Bonhoeffer did believe it was the duty of every Christian to follow 
Christ’s divine example. “We are not Christs, but if we want to be 
Christians, we must show something of Christ’s breadth of sympathy 
by acting responsibly, by grasping our ‘hour,’ by facing danger like 
free men, by displaying a real sympathy which springs not from fear, 
but from the liberating and redeeming love of Christ for all who 
suffer.”27
After the close of the Finkenwalde seminary in 1937, life became 
increasingly difficult for Bonhoeffer as more and more of his personal 
liberties were slowly being pierced by the Gestapo’s ever-watchful 
  
                                                          
26 Roark, Dietrich Bonhoeffer.  
27 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison (New York: The MacMillan 
Company, 1953), 30.  
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gaze. Persuaded by his friends’ fears that to remain in Germany would 
cost him his life and rob the movement of one of its greatest voices, 
Bonhoeffer traveled to America briefly in 1939.28 Although he had 
acquiesced to his friends’ wishes, upon arriving in the New World, he 
knew immediately that his departure had been a mistake, and sought 
to return to Germany straight away. Despite knowing this decision 
could bring to bear terrible consequences for Bonhoeffer, he argued 
that were he to abandon his parishioners in their struggle against the 
Nazis, he would be entitled no say in their path to redemption. Upon 
his return, Bonhoeffer allied himself fully with the political resistance to 
Hitler and the Nazi Party.29
                                                          
28 Robertson, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 8-9.  
29 Ibid.  
 No longer believing that his theological 
battles could remain separate from the political war now raging, 
Bonhoeffer adopted new tactics with which to fight. Since he was no 
longer permitted to lecture or publish anywhere within the growing 
German sphere of influence, he began an underground relationship 
with a group of officers within the German Military Intelligence Service 
who opposed Hitler and were making preparations for an assassination 
attempt. Disregarding his abhorrence for violence in all its forms, 
Bonhoeffer, no longer able to see any alternative, cast his lot with the 
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dissenters. He would later justify his actions thusly: "It is not only my 
task to look after the victims of madmen who drive a motor-car in a 
crowded street, but to do all in my power to stop their driving at all."30
As word of the secret plot to assassinate the High Chancellor 
reached the Gestapo, immediate retributive action was taken. All those 
known to have been involved in the plot, including Bonhoeffer, were 
arrested in April of 1943. Bonhoeffer spent the next eighteen months 
of his life in a German prison, unsure of his ultimate fate. In spite of 
this uncertainty, he occupied himself as best he could with 
correspondence to family and friends and with Ethics, an attempted 
justification of his recent actions in the attempted coup.
  
31
                                                          
30 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, trans. R. H. Fuller, rev. ed. (New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1960), 22.  
31 Robertson, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 11-12.  
 With the aid 
of guards sympathetic to his cause, he maintained close contact with 
members of the resistance during his imprisonment. It was through 
these contacts that he learned of the second failed attempt on the 
Fuhrer’s life that would ultimately result in his own execution. The High 
Chancellor, now determined not to allow his enemies a third 
opportunity at assassination, began a “Nero-like purge,” of all those 
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known to oppose him.32 Bonhoeffer was among the many who lost 
their lives as a result of Hitler’s vengeance. After leading his fellow 
prisoners in one final service, Dietrich Bonhoeffer was led to the 
gallows of the Nazi prison camp in Flossenburg where he was executed 
on 8 April, 1945. He was thirty-nine years old.33
Bonhoeffer’s first notable contributions to the field of Christian 
theology were presented in his doctoral dissertation, Sanctorum 
Communio (The Community of Saints). Largely written as a criticism of 
  
Though Bonhoeffer’s death proved unnecessary, his life had 
been anything but. His work in the fields of systematic theology and 
dogmatic principles has influenced the development of western 
theology and the world ecumenical movement in such dramatic fashion 
that neither would be recognizable in their present forms without his 
contributions. Now that the historical framework has been established, 
providing the context of his life and action, a more in-depth analysis of 
his theology can begin. Only after careful examination of Bonhoeffer’s 
central theological constructs can his views on history, as well as his 
historical significance, be completely ascertained.     
                                                          
32 Ibid.   
33 Ibid.  
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the current theological tendency to classify the Church in purely 
sociological terms, Sanctorum Communio examines “whether and how 
the empirical Church and the Church in its true nature, from the 
logical, sociological and theological point of view be brought together 
in a single concept.”34 For Bonhoeffer, the Church is simply “Christ 
existing as community,” and therefore not subject to the restrictions 
placed upon it by any particular denomination.35 Thus, his concept of 
Religionless Christianity does not mean Christianity without God as it 
has so often been interpreted, but rather Christianity without the 
divisions of sectarian theology. That being said, Bonhoeffer does not 
discount the significance of sociology in his theological studies but 
rather believes that a dialogue between the two would help the 
Christian community better understand its proper place in the world. 
Because Christ is present in the Church and the Christ is a part of the 
world, Bonhoeffer logically concluded that Church must also be present 
in the world. 36
                                                          
34 Marle, Bonhoeffer: The Man and his Work, 42.  
35 Robertson, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 13.  
36 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, No Rusty Swords, ed. and trans. by Edwin H. Robertson and John 
Bowden (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965), 97-99.  
 Rather than isolate itself from the evils of the outside 
world, the Church, like Christ, must brave the uncertainties of this 
world in order to bring divine salvation to the masses. Only then can 
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the Church ever realize its true nature and reason for existence. “The 
unity of the Church is both in its origin and in its goal; in fulfillment as 
much as in promise. Where the unity of the Church is forgotten as its 
origin, human organizations for union take the place of unity in Jesus 
Christ.”37 It was in response to just such an occurrence that 
Bonhoeffer began to develop his next theological concept: Jesus Christ 
as the man for others.38
The schism of the German Christian Church in reaction to the 
rise of Nazism caused Bonhoeffer to become disillusioned with the 
Church’s inability to discern its true nature and purpose in the world. 
Bonhoeffer began to adapt his theology to deal with the problems now 
facing the Christian community. Using scripture in the formulation of 
his new theological construct, Bonhoeffer argued that “All created 
things are through Christ and exist only in Christ (Col. 1:16). This 
means that there is nothing, neither person nor things, which stand 
outside the relation to Christ.”
  
39
                                                          
37 Ibid., 99.   
38 Ernst Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Translated by Martin Rumscheidt 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press), 92-95.  
39 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 262, as presented in Jurgen Moltmann and Jurgen 
Weissbach’s Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1967), 113.  
 Therefore, Bonhoeffer’s construct of 
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Jesus Christ as the man for others was his attempt to demonstrate 
God’s omnipresence in the physical world. Bonhoeffer argued that 
even if the Church had forgotten its true nature and replaced Christ 
with human organizations, its redemption through Christ was still 
possible.40 Just as Jesus had been a light unto the world, so too, must 
his disciples. “That light is not simply something the community must 
hold aloft by its words. We must be the light, and if we cannot be seen 
to be it, then we are betraying our call.”41
 As Bonhoeffer’s theologies continued to develop, an all-
encompassing theory of history began to emerge. This theory is most 
clearly referenced in his theological construct of The World Come of 
Age. It is this concept that best defines Bonhoeffer’s theology in terms 
of historical relevance. In short, Bonhoeffer’s theory of history is 
Christocentric. And since for Bonhoeffer the Church was “Christ 
 The duty of every Christian 
should be to help bring about the reformation of the Church and its 
reunification with Christ by following his divine example. For 
Bonhoeffer, this was accomplished with the restructuring of the 
Church’s theology. One of his subsequent works, No Rusty Swords, 
deals primarily with how this objective might be achieved.  
                                                          
40 Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 59-61.  
41 Marle, Bonhoeffer: The Man and his Work, 82.  
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existing as community,” it is the Church that exists at the center of 
history.42 Like Augustine before him, Bonhoeffer considered the “Christ 
event” to be the single most important event in human history. 
“Having described the Fall as the breaking of the link between God and 
man, he shows that this leads to the tearing of the fabric of humanity. 
The saving act of Christ is then seen, not only as the reconciling of 
man to God, but also as the restoring of the torn fabric of humanity.”43
In keeping with this line of thought, The World Come of Age is 
Bonhoeffer’s method of describing the maturation of the Church in the 
time since the Christ event. For Bonhoeffer, the Middle Ages represent 
the Church’s adolescence: a time when the Church “sought to subject 
the natural realm to the realm of grace.”
 
However, unlike Augustine, Bonhoeffer does not believe that the 
ultimate salvation of humankind is contingent upon the second coming 
of Christ. Rather, he argues that since the Church is already “Christ 
existing as community,” it is through the Church that the man’s 
salvation will ultimately be attained.  
44
                                                          
42 Robertson, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 13. 
43 Ibid., 14.  
44 Moltmann and Weissbach, Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer, 117.  
 He argued that to ignore 
the natural world in favor of the divine was to deny the prevalence of 
28 
 
Christ in all things. “The world is not divided between Christ and the 
devil, but whether it recognizes it or not, it is solely and entirely the 
world of Christ.”45 In following this chronology, it was the Renaissance 
and Reformation that allowed the Church to progress from adolescence 
into early adulthood. Since, for Bonhoeffer, this move away from the 
Church as the sole source of knowledge and elucidation resulted in the 
secularization of the world, Religionless Christianity was merely his 
argument that “in the modem secular age the mission of the church 
must assume a secular style.”46 Rather than viewing this secularization 
as the downfall of the Church, Bonhoeffer views it as its ultimate 
salvation. When Man can envision God as present in all things and no 
longer confined only to certain aspects of life and of the physical world, 
only then can true unity between Man and God be realized and the 
promise of Christ fulfilled.47
Although Bonhoeffer’s untimely demise at the hands of the Nazis 
did not afford him the opportunity to finalize his theology and historical 
  
                                                          
45 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 70, available in Moltmann and Weissbach’s Two Studies, 
117.  
46 Paulose Mar Paulose, Encounter in Humanization: Insights for Christian-Marxist 
Dialogue and Cooperation, available from the Religion online website http://www.religion-
online.org/showchapter.asp?title=1572&C=1515 Accessed 19 March, 2007.   
47 Peter Vorkink, II, Bonhoeffer in a World Come of Age (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1968), 54-58.  
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theory, his influence on ecclesiastical scholarship is undeniable. Faced 
with the challenge of finding God in the secularized world of the 
twentieth century, Bonhoeffer found strength in the Church. When he 
believed that the Church had forgotten its true nature and purpose, he 
sought to reform it. When the Church was not ready to be reformed, 
he tried to change the world. And like many others who have 
undertaken such an incredible task, Bonhoeffer did not live to see the 
full fruition of his life’s work, but that does not mean that he died a 
failure. Although an unintended martyr, he was able to draw strength 
from his beliefs and discern purpose from his hardships. “It is infinitely 
easier to suffer in obedience to a human command than to accept 
suffering as free, responsible men. It is infinitely easier to suffer with 
others than to suffer alone. It is infinitely easier to suffer as public 
heroes than to suffer apart and in ignominy. It is infinitely easier to 
suffer physical death than to endure spiritual suffering. Christ suffered 
as a free man alone, apart and in ignominy, in body and in spirit, and 
since that day many Christians have suffered with him.”48
                                                          
48 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 31.  
 Throughout 
his life, Bonhoeffer had advocated “costly discipleship for Christ.” In 
the end, it was he who was to define this concept in the most 
inimitable fashion. A true proponent and follower of his own theology, 
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Dietrich Bonhoeffer died as he had lived, leaving behind an undeniable 
legacy and cementing his place in history as one of the greatest 
theologians of the twentieth century.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
CHAPTER 3 
PAUL RAMSEY: HIS LIFE AND WORKS 
 
“No matter how much heritage there is in it, Christian ethics has 
to do with the present and not with history that is past. This calls for a 
constructive elaboration of the way the data of morality and 
contemporary moral demands may be comprehended in the light of 
Christian faith.”49
                                                          
49 Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950), xiv.  
 These are the words of Christian ethicist Paul 
Ramsey. Undoubtedly one of the most brilliant, analytical, and 
controversial minds of the twentieth century, Ramsey dedicated 
himself tirelessly to the formation of a Christian code of ethics that 
was socially, politically, and culturally relevant enough to sustain itself 
in the modern age. Examining a variety of issues including just war 
theory, racial equality, abortion, euthanasia, and genetic manipulation, 
Ramsey attempted to apply the “timeless” values of Christian love and 
selflessness to as many modern-day issues of morality and justice as 
his time and energy would allow. Although critics argue that his 
attempts at formulating a set of “exceptionless principles” never came 
to fruition, Ramsey’s unsuccessful endeavors nevertheless 
demonstrate not only his analytical brilliance but also his cultural 
significance. Fellow Christian ethicist James Gustafson once observed, 
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“Paul Ramsey has been a towering and forceful figure for almost four 
decades; his writing has forced persons with alternative views to come 
to grips with his thought, and had a deep impact on a younger 
generation of authors.”50
 Paul Ramsey was born on December 10, 1913, in Mendenhall, 
Mississippi. His parents, the Reverend John Ramsey and Mamie McCay 
Ramsey, belonged to the Methodist denomination and raised young 
Paul in accordance with its tenets. Little academic attention has been 
given to Ramsey’s life prior to the beginning of his teaching tenure at 
Princeton University in 1944, save the mention of his marriage to Effie 
Register on June 23, 1937, and a brief discussion of his earliest works, 
 By the time of his death in February, 1988, 
Paul Ramsey had authored more than a dozen books and countless 
articles and treatises and established himself as one of the most 
influential Christian theologians of the twentieth century. Although this 
essay will focus primarily upon such major works as Basic Christian 
Ethics and Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics, an attempt will be 
made to sufficiently outline the ongoing intellectual and theological 
development of Paul Ramsey throughout his career in the hope of 
providing a more complete and representative analysis.  
                                                          
50 James Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective II, 84, as quoted in Laurens 
Wouter Bilkes’ Theological Ethics and Holy Scripture (Alberta, Canada: Inheritance Publications, 
1997), 71.  
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including a message given in 1935 as student body president of 
Millsaps College, as well as an address to the Yale Philosophy Club 
circa 1940.51 The last two are of primary concern for academics in that 
they indicate a pacifist ideology, a position that Ramsey would spend 
the majority of his professional career attempting to refute. Criticized 
by many, including later himself, as symptomatic of the naivety and 
idealism of youth, Ramsey’s 1935 addressed ended thusly: “to love 
peace enough to be willing to die for its preservation against the forces 
which tend to create war is Jesus’ method of projecting his ideal into 
reality. Have we the courage to follow Jesus completely? Upon the 
answer we give to this hangs the destiny of our civilization.”52 Written 
in the aftermath of World War I and in the ominous shadow of World 
War II, Ramsey’s plea for pacifism was infused “with the idealism that 
characterized the Christian Church in America during the first part of 
the twentieth century.”53
                                                          
51 Lauren Wouter Bilkes, Theological Ethics and Holy Scripture , 71.  
52 Paul Ramsey, “Christianity and War,” 1935a, 203, as quoted in David Atwood’s Paul 
Ramsey’s Political Ethics (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1992), 12.  
53 D. Stephen Long, Tragedy, Tradition, Transformism: The Ethics of Paul Ramsey 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1993), 6.  
 Although the idealism of his youth would 
ultimately be replaced by the realism of his experience, Ramsey 
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always struggled with “a pacifist conscience.”54 His 1940 essay “The 
Use of Destructive Force is Never Justifiable,” although written after 
the commencement of hostilities in the Second World War, 
nonetheless demonstrates his continued attraction to pacifist ideology. 
However, the transparent naivety of Ramsey’s youth was slowly being 
tempered by the harsh realities of war and the influence of theologians 
H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr who mentored Ramsey while he was 
at Yale University.55
It was also during his time at Yale, where he earned his Bachelor 
of Divinity Degree in 1940 and his Ph.D. in 1943, that Ramsey began 
to develop formally the structural outline of his first major work, Basic 
Christian Ethics. Influenced largely by the relativism of [H. Richard] 
Niebuhr and the waning pacifist tendencies of his own youth, both of 
which he would later refute, Ramsey’s early theological writings still 
demonstrate his newly-burgeoning commitment to the formation of a 
system of rules, or principles, from which the whole of Christian ethics 
could and should be derived. Like Niebuhr, who relied upon an 
essential theological and philosophical principle that he deemed 
“beyond ethics,” Ramsey’s basic approach to ethics was grounded in a 
  
                                                          
54 David Atwood, Paul Ramsey’s Political Ethics, 12.  
55 D. Stephen Long, Tragedy, Tradition, Transformism, 12. 
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belief in two fundamental truths that he considered completely 
inarguable. The first principle is as follows: “God is good and all the 
beings whom he has created are good.” The second principle is 
subordinate and entirely dependent upon the first: “Thou shalt love 
thy neighbor whom God has created and given thee.”56
Ramsey’s professional career began in 1937 when, while still 
completing his Bachelor of Divinity Degree at Yale, he served as an 
instructor in the Social and Political Science Departments at Millsaps 
College. After completing his degree, Ramsey left his alma mater for 
Garrett Theological Seminary where he served as an associate 
professor of Christian ethics for two years. But it was not until the 
completion of his Ph.D. in 1943 and his subsequent appointment to the 
faculty of Princeton University that Paul Ramsey’s theological career 
 While neither 
of these initial truths could be considered revolutionary in either 
content or connotation, they, in fact, provided the basic structure for 
one of the most innovative and thoroughly modern theologies of the 
twentieth century. And while these principles evolved with the passage 
of time, Ramsey’s defense of them, in both theory and practice, 
remained largely unchanged.  
                                                          
56 Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, as quoted in Stephen Long’s Tragedy, Tradition, 
Transformism, 12 .  
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really began to take the form that historians and theologians now 
associate with him.   
Throughout the 1940s, Ramsey wrote a series of essays 
concerning the form and function of Christian ethics in the twentieth 
century. These would ultimately form the essence of his 1950 treatise, 
Basic Christian Ethics. Although the construction for his arguments had 
remained relatively intact since his address to the Yale Philosophy Club 
some ten years earlier, the essence of those arguments had changed. 
“In the ‘Destructive Force’ essay it is God’s goodness and creation’s 
goodness, whereas in Basic Christian Ethics it is God’s covenant. From 
this first principle duties are derived which are then defensible.”57 Like 
the relativism of Niebuhr, Ramsey’s argument, while guised in reason 
and logic, nonetheless remains “fundamentally non-rational,” because 
at its base is a position that the author insists is beyond 
contestation.58
                                                          
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid., 13.  
 And although Basic Christian Ethics has since been 
criticized by theologians as situationalist in nature, it nonetheless 
chronicles Ramsey’s first attempt at creating a system of rules, or 
principles, by which the modern Christian should strive to live, and 
37 
 
therefore, is still worthy of careful attention if one is to understand the 
complexities and contradictions of his later thought.  
Attempting to build on his theory of the primary and derivative 
nature of principles in the study of Christian ethics, Ramsey opens his 
first major treatise with an interesting correlation: “It is impossible for 
every word in a dictionary to have derivative meaning; some words 
fundamental to all the rest must be given meaning “primitively” by 
pointing…‘Christian love’ is a similar fundamental notion in the theory 
of Christian ethics.”59 Once this idea has been founded, Ramsey then 
proceeds to outline the two primary sources of “Christian love” in order 
to establish the notion of “covenant” as the centrifugal consequence of 
that love and, consequently, as the primary theme for his work. “For a 
proper study of the origin and nature of Christian ethics, a distinction 
may be made between (1) God’s righteousness and love and (2) the 
reign of this righteousness in the Kingdom of God. These are the two 
sources of ‘Christian love.’ Never imagine you have rightly grasped a 
biblical ethical idea until you have succeeded in reducing it to a simple 
corollary of one or the other of these notions, or of the idea of 
covenant between God and man from which they both stem.”60
                                                          
59 Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, xvi.  
 And 
60 Ibid., 2.  
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since Ramsey’s theory of ethics is primarily founded upon the New 
Testament, the covenant between God and man is necessarily 
personified in Jesus Christ.  
This is not to say that Ramsey’s theory of ethics is entirely 
metaphysical in nature, but simply that it presupposes faith as a 
necessary condition for understanding it. In fact, Ramsey proceeds to 
rebuke those secular theorists and philosophers who argue that 
religion only brings mysticism to the study of ethics. “Whoever 
imagines that religion adds to ethics only the threat of supernaturally 
administered punishment has simply never read the Bible.”61 He then 
proceeds to support this claim by drawing a distinction between the 
biblical definition of justice, as embodied in the personage of Jesus 
Christ, and the more limited interpretations of that term in modern 
society. Only by examining Christ’s understanding and “redemptive” 
use of justice in the biblical context can one ever discover its meaning 
and implication for his own time and situation. “Jesus Christ must be 
kept at the center of all Christian thinking about justice – and precisely 
that sort of justice which should prevail in the ‘world of systems,’ in 
this world and not some other.”62
                                                          
61 Ibid., 13.  
 Because, for Ramsey, Christ best 
62 Ibid., 17.  
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embodies these biblical notions of “love” and “justice” and completes 
this covenant between God and man, it is he who must serve as a 
model for Christians in every age and in every circumstance. And since 
Christ’s conceptions of “love” and “justice” are unabashedly selfless in 
nature, so too must be those of his followers. In other words, 
“Christian love is: to be a Christ to our neighbors.”63
Following his discussion of biblical “justice” and “disinterested 
[i.e. selfless] neighbor love,” Ramsey continues on to discuss the 
ramifications of attempting to carry out these basic principles in the 
modern world. As Ramsey explains, the world of Jesus Christ and his 
followers had been completely apocalyptic in nature, and therefore 
unconcerned with the questions that an ethic of “selfless love” and 
“righteous justice” failed to answer. “Jesus himself did not think that 
the gospel of love would be sufficient by itself to resolve the totality of 
evil in many life-situations, or to defeat the demonic power of evil 
 Only by placing 
the needs of one’s neighbor above his own, can a Christian ever begin 
to understand the true meaning of “Christian love” and the full 
implication of his individual and communal covenant with God. For 
Ramsey, Christian ethics must necessarily be reduced to this basic 
concept. All else is secondary and derivative in nature.  
                                                          
63 Ibid., 21.   
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encompassing even those purely personal relationships which in 
themselves are often amenable to love’s persuasion.”64 Instead, 
Ramsey argued that because Jesus Christ and his followers had been 
so convinced of their own proximity to the end of days, it was useless 
to worry about such earthly concerns as retribution or vengeance 
because these issues would be addressed by God himself. It is here 
where Ramsey’s split with Christian theological and ethical tradition, as 
well as his formal parting from pacifist ideology, can first be witnessed 
because it is precisely at this juncture when Ramsey states the 
problem with this ideology is that “there is always more than one 
neighbor and indeed a whole cluster of claims and responsibilities to 
be considered.”65 As theology professor Stephen Long notes, “In Basic 
Christian Ethics pacifism is a superior value that can no longer be 
normative because of the relatively more important need for lower 
values such as order in service to the neighbor.”66
                                                          
64 Ibid., 36.   
65 Ibid., 42.  
66 Stephen Long, Tragedy, Tradition, Transformism, 17.  
 In other words, in 
the non-apocalyptic world of modern society, pragmatism and concern 
for both worldly and divine justice must become a part of Christian 
ethics. While this, in and of itself, is still hardly radical, this “idealistic 
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realism” nevertheless opened the door to Ramsey’s subsequent, and 
indeed revolutionary, discussions over the ensuing decades concerning 
the law and medicine, as well as social and political theory.  
With his assertion that “Jesus Christ ‘finishes’ any ethic of 
conventional respectability, any customary code of conduct into which 
at least every man is born, any more or less philosophic definition of 
good and evil in which ‘at least everyone claimeth to be an authority,’” 
Ramsey firmly begins to establish his own particular brand of Christian 
ethics.67 This claim further demonstrates his own contempt for and 
break from the traditional Christian and “natural law” codes of morality 
and justice, in favor of this selfless concern with the needs of one’s 
neighbor, regardless of the rules and regulations of law. In the words 
of St. Paul, “Love and do as you then please.”68
                                                          
67 Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, 54.  
68 Ibid., 77.   
 And while this may 
seem an unusual starting point for the development of a system of 
basic “exceptionless principles” by which the modern Christian should 
strive to live, for Ramsey no contradiction or sense of duplicity existed. 
Rather, Ramsey concluded that Jesus “was not discriminating between 
the importance or unimportance of laws so much as between their 
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fundamental or derivative nature.”69
First published in 1967, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics 
comprises Ramsey’s second attempt at establishing a set of 
“exceptionless principles” by which the modern Christian should live. 
Written largely as a response to those who had labeled his Basic 
Christian Ethics as situationalist in nature, Deeds and Rules seeks to 
clarify and expound upon his theological and ethical positions of some 
 As such, Ramsey then logically 
supposed that by basing his own system of ethical principles around 
the ideas of “Christian love” and “biblical justice,” he could deduce and 
then construct a viable code of conduct, able to withstand any 
situation, no matter how modern or complex. Interestingly enough, it 
was also this supposition that caused many of his critics to label 
Ramsey as a situationalist, including later even himself, but he would 
respond to these critics in his next major work on the subject: Deeds 
and Rules in Christian Ethics. In any case, Ramsey spends the 
remainder of Basic Christian Ethics laying the groundwork for Deeds 
and Rules by outlining the various kinds of Christian love, the duties 
that each implies, the theological evolution of each over time, as well 
as the basic structure for his ethic of Christian resistance which he 
would more fully develop in the years ahead.  
                                                          
69 Ibid., 64.  
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seventeen years earlier in the hope of better illuminating the heart of 
his argument. Composed in the finest philosophical tradition, Ramsey 
presents the case of each of his opponents and then methodically 
proceeds to refute them. Ramsey opens his work by responding to the 
1963 essay Towards a Quaker View of Sex, which dealt primarily with 
the Church’s position about when sexual intercourse between 
consenting adults could be viewed as right in the eyes of God. While 
the Quaker essay argues that the answer to this question relies 
entirely on the love shared between those persons involved and “that 
love cannot be confined to a pattern. The waywardness of love is part 
of its nature and this is both its glory and its tragedy. If love did not 
tend to leap every barrier, if it could be tamed, it would not be the 
tremendous creative power we know it to be and want it to be.”70 
However, Ramsey counters, “How can Christians nourish the seeds of 
a wider social responsibility while seeming to praise only acts and 
never rules that embody personal responsibility between two parties to 
sexual relations?...No social morality ever was founded, or ever will be 
founded, upon a situational ethic.”71
                                                          
70 Friends Home Service Committee, Friends House, Euston Road, London, 1963: Friends 
Book Store, 302 Arch St., Philadelphia, Penn., as quoted in Paul Ramsey’s Deeds and Rules in 
Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), 16.  
 
71 Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules, 20.  
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In the following chapter, Ramsey challenges the situationalist 
ethic of Bishop John A. T. Robinson, author of Honest to God. At first 
glance, Robinson’s ethic seems to be largely in step with that of 
Ramsey’s from his earlier work. “We are to be men for others as Jesus 
Christ was ‘the man for others.’ This means having absolutely no 
absolutes but his love, being totally uncommitted in every other 
respect but totally committed in this.72 Ramsey could only logically 
agree with this statement, given the primacy he had given the 
principle of “Christian love” in Basic Christian Ethics. However, 
Robinson believes this to be representative of situationalism in that 
love is and always must be the sole guiding force in the Christian’s 
decision-making process. Ramsey, however posits that, “Robinson’s 
voice is the voice of pure act-agapism, but his hands are the hands of 
rule-agapism.”73 He then goes on to say that “the work of Christian 
ethics in clarifying the categories – truth-telling, promise-keeping, 
theft, lying, murder – is not ordinarily a matter of love allowing an 
exception to a fixed definition of these terms but a matter of love 
illuminating the meaning of them.”74
                                                          
72 J.A.T. Robinson, Honest to God (London: 1963), as quoted in Paul Ramsey’s Rules and 
Deeds, 23.  
73 Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules, 22.  
 In essence, Ramsey is not 
74 Ibid., 37.  
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refuting Robinson’s argument so much as relabeling it. Both men 
agree that love must be at the center of all Christian morality and 
ethical responsibility, but while Robinson argues that this means all 
else is of little concern for the Christian moralist, Ramsey asserts that, 
by using love as the lens by which to view these other concepts, a 
greater understanding of these subordinate rules may be ascertained, 
and in the process a basic Christian ethic formed.  
In the next chapters, Ramsey addresses Dr. Paul Lehmann’s 
Ethics in a Christian Context and Professor William Frankena’s “Love 
and Principle in Christian Ethics.” He summarizes Lehmann’s book 
thusly: “It is a book on the doctrine of the Church, on the methodology 
of Christian ethics, on messianism or christology, on justification, on 
divine and human freedom, on what God is doing in the world making 
for maturity and the new humanity.”75
                                                          
75 Ibid., 73.  
 And although Ramsey seems to 
applaud Lehmann for his attempt at understanding the contextual 
background of Christian ethics, he seems unimpressed with many of 
Lehmann’s conclusions. For example, when Lehmann posits that “this 
is why it makes all the difference in the world…in what context your 
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ethical insights and practices are nourished,”76 Ramsey counters, “still 
the soil is not the same as the tree, nor are its roots the branches; nor 
even the composition of the nourishment the same as the fruit 
expected.”77
Because of what Ramsey deems the insufficiencies of Lehmann’s 
thought, he next turns his attention to the work of William Frankena in 
a chapter he entitles, “An Unfinished Agenda.” Frankena’s work, to 
which Ramsey acknowledges his own indebtedness, is primarily 
concerned with the classification of the types of rules and principles 
that may be found in Christian ethics as well as the different forms of 
agapism that may be used in determining these classifications. 
Frankena’s characterizations of “Christian love” into the categories of 
pure agapism, mixed agapism, and non-agapism seems, to Ramsey, a 
most logical place to begin in the formalizing of a structure of basic 
Christian ethics. And while Ramsey supports many of Frankena’s ideas 
 In other words, while knowing the context of each 
individual situation is undoubtedly important, failing to understand the 
consistencies from circumstance to circumstance is, in effect, to 
remain always ignorant of the commonalities of human experience.  
                                                          
76 Paul Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Context (New York and Evanston: 1963), as quoted 
from Paul Ramsey’s Deeds and Rules, 51. 
77 Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules, 51.  
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concerning these classifications, he is not convinced that the Christian 
must effectively choose one of these forms to the exclusion of the 
others. “The question to be debated is rather whether the ‘orders’ are 
to be understood only Christologically (pure-agapism) or also in some 
degree by natural reason (mixed-agapism). The latter possibility would 
seem to be entailed in the conviction that when Christ came He came 
to ‘His own.’”78
Ramsey’s next chapter, “Two Concepts of General Rules in 
Christian Ethics,” remains his only real attempt throughout Deeds and 
Rules to formalize the structure of his “exceptionless principles” into 
any sort of working order. In it, he argues, “the reason for rules is that 
we know not every Christian – nor any of us all the time – is able to 
apply the law of love effortlessly and flawlessly.”
  
79
                                                          
78 Ibid., 120.  
79 Ibid., 125.  
 Continuing his 
thoughts on Bishop Robinson’s Honest to God, Ramsey states, “the 
fact that nothing other than agape makes a thing right or wrong does 
not mean that nothing is made right or wrong. The fact that there is 
only one commandment [to love] and that every other injunction 
depends on it and is an explication or application of it, does not mean 
that there are no generally valid explications and applications in 
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‘special ethics’ of that one norm of general ethics.”80 Perhaps even 
more profound is Ramsey’s statement that just because a Christian 
may be unaware of these general principles does not necessarily him a 
situationalist make.81 In fact, Ramsey goes so far as to suggest that 
situationalism, as it has been described by these theologians, simply 
cannot exist given the human condition of civilization. “Everywhere, 
and at all recorded times, practices precede individual choice. It is 
never a question of getting to the point where the logic of rules of 
practices begins to apply, or of getting to the crux of either justifying 
actions by the practices they fall under or else undertaking the reform 
of a practice as a whole. Every man already stands at this point.”82
While Deeds and Rules effectively refutes the situationalist 
perspective in contemporary Christian ethics, Ramsey fails to complete 
the formalization of his “exceptionless principles” much further beyond 
this point. While he does draw distinctions between his own theory of 
ethics and that of “legalism” and “natural law” in the closing chapters, 
he never offers tangible corrections to the errors he perceives. This 
has proven to be the greatest criticism of Ramsey’s work both during 
  
                                                          
80 Ibid., 129.  
81 Ibid., 133.  
82 Ibid., 144.  
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his career and in the years since his death: that he spent so much 
time and energy describing the fallacies of others’ thoughts that he 
never finalized his own. However, what Ramsey was able to 
accomplish was to establish the primacy of “Christian love” in the 
moralist’s decision-making process, as well as to establish that this 
concept does in fact represent a basic rule, and that this rule does 
support and inform certain lesser principles, which are also equally 
present and quite necessary for the study of ethics if the model of 
Christ is ever to be achieved. Perhaps this is accomplishment enough. 
At any rate, confident at the very least that he had effectively 
demonstrated the errors of situationalism, Ramsey then turned his 
attentions to a variety of topical issues of his day, including race 
relations and the theory of “just war” in the 1960s, and then to 
medical and biological ethics in the 1970s, before returning once more 
to the issue of “just war” in the 1980s, all in an effort to accomplish 
what he had, thus far, failed to do: apply the theoretical ethics of 
Christian principles to contemporary real-world problems. What follows 
is a brief summary of some of his most important works in these 
fields.  
Let us first turn our attentions to Ramsey’s writings on the Civil 
Rights Movement of the 1950s and 60s, best embodied in his 1961 
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manuscript, Christian Ethics and the Sit-In. In the introduction, 
Ramsey maintains that while he acknowledges the sit-in movement as 
both a societal and Christian struggle, he nevertheless believes that 
“there is a place for reflective examination of any social movement and 
for self-examination even in the best of causes.”83 As a result, 
Ramsey’s book is primarily an analysis of the movement and its 
implications for society as well as an attempt at defining the certain 
Christian principles that must be applied if it is to be conducted in a 
responsible and ethical manner. It is of interest to note that Ramsey is 
able to draw a direct comparison between the non-violent resistance of 
the sit-in movement and the theory of “just war” in the Christian 
theological tradition. For example, while discussing the broader 
ramifications of the economic sanctions initiated by the sit-in 
movement, Ramsey asserts, “Indiscriminating boycotts are the moral 
equivalent of obliterating people in warfare in order to get at their 
government, or to a direct attack upon a man’s wife and children in 
order to restrain his own murderous intent.”84
                                                          
83 Paul Ramsey, Christian Ethics and the Sit-In (New York: Association Press, 1961), x.  
84 Ibid., 107.  
 Instead, he argues, 
“Action located where the evil is concentrated will prove most decisive 
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and is most clearly legitimate.”85 Ramsey cautions against the 
secularist tendency of allowing the ends to justify the means, no 
matter the nature of the struggle. Consequently, he maintains that 
such uses of resistance, whether non-violent or otherwise, must 
always be exercised with extreme caution and care. In summation, 
Ramsey posits, “The justification in Christian conscience of the use of 
any mode of resistance also lays down its limitation – in the distinction 
between the persons against whom pressure is primarily directed, 
those upon whom it may be permitted also to fall, and those who may 
never be directly repressed for the sake even of achieving some great 
good.”86
                                                          
85 Ibid., 108-9.  
 In effect, while still making his support for the sit-in 
movement known, Ramsey still is able to offer critical insight into the 
practicable ethics of such a movement in a way that causes even the 
most well-intentioned participants to reexamine themselves in the 
hope of preventing the deterioration of the movement into a less-than-
Christian struggle. Having sufficiently addressed the ethical concerns 
of the Civil Rights Movement, Ramsey then turned his attention to the 
issue of “just war” as represented in the then-current struggle with 
Vietnam.  
86 Ibid., 113-14.  
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Given that an entire chapter of this thesis will later be dedicated 
to Ramsey’s work concerning “Just War,” what follows here is only the 
briefest of summaries concerning his work on the subject. “Ramsey’s 
writings on war and politics, as well as his sustained attention to the 
need to protect persons most liable to exploitation and abuse, reflect a 
stance toward the human condition that takes the human tendency to 
evil very seriously.”87 Building on many of the concepts from his social 
theology in Christian Ethics and the Sit-In, Ramsey dedicated himself 
tirelessly throughout the 1960s to providing guidelines by which 
modern-day Christians could conduct themselves justly and morally in 
the sometimes-necessary evil of international warfare. As theologian 
Charles Curran once noted, “Ramsey accepts the famous dictum of 
Reinhold Niebuhr that man’s capacity for justice makes democracy 
possible, but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy 
necessary.”88
                                                          
87 William Werpehowski and Stephen D. Crocco, eds., as quoted from The Essential Paul 
Ramsey (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), xx.  
88 Charles Curran, Politics, Medicine, and Christian Ethics: A Dialogue with Paul Ramsey 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), 12.  
 In similar fashion, Ramsey’s work on the justification 
and limitation of war within a Christian context demonstrates his belief 
that for warfare ever to be conducted humanely and as morally as the 
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situation allows, a system of basic rules and principles must be firmly 
established.  
Ramsey’s major works on this subject include War and the 
Christian Conscience (1961), Who Speaks for the Church (1967), The 
Just War (1968), and his final work, Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism 
(1988). Again, all of these works are discussed in greater detail in the 
ensuing chapters of this essay, so for now, a summation of his overall 
war ethic, as represented in his most thorough treatise on the subject, 
The Just War, will have to suffice. Himself a proponent of the “Just 
War Theory” of both medieval and modern Catholicism, Ramsey 
“sought to drive a wedge between ‘pacifists’ who reject war because it 
has no limit and ‘realists’ who insist that wars must in justice be 
fought, albeit (and tragically in the modern age) without limit.”89
In order to demonstrate the fallacies of pacifism as a national 
political policy, Ramsey recounts the biblical story of the Good 
Samaritan, but with an added literary twist for effect. In this retelling, 
he asks, “what do you think Jesus would have made the Samaritan do 
 By 
doing so, Ramsey hoped to establish both the justification and the 
limitation of moral warfare in the modern, nuclear age.  
                                                          
89 William Werpehowski and Stephen D. Crocco, eds., as quoted from The Essential Paul 
Ramsey, 60.  
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if he had come upon the scene while the robbers were still at their fell 
work?”90 What Ramsey is attempting to demonstrate is that while 
pacifism and non-resistance on a personal scale can indeed be morally 
justified, pacifism on an interpersonal level can never be so. In other 
words, while it may be morally and ethically appropriate to “turn the 
other cheek” when confronted with oppression, it is inherently immoral 
and unethical to turn the cheek of your neighbor in a similar situation. 
With this correlation, Ramsey not only effectively demonstrates the 
problems with pacifism on a national scale but also encircles his own 
brand of resistance in the bonds of Christian neighbor love. Having 
done so, it is only another small step for Ramsey to apply this 
“principle” to a national, and indeed global, stage. “Thus, participation 
in war (and before that, the use of any form of force or resistance) 
was justified as, in this world to date, an unavoidable necessity if we 
are not to omit to serve the needs of men in the only concrete way 
possible, and to maintain a just endurable order in which they may 
live.”91
                                                          
90 Paul Ramsey, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1968), 143.  
91 Ibid.  
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Having adequately shown that the use of resistance can, at time, 
be both morally and ethically justified, Ramsey then turned his 
attention to the modernization of the just war theory in the nuclear 
age. To those that would argue that nuclear weapons have invalidated 
the “just war” claim, given their unprecedented capacity for 
destruction and inability to discriminate, Ramsey countered that while 
the direct attack of non-combatants is always unethical, what is 
needed is a modification of the Just War theory, not its abdication. To 
that end, Ramsey goes on to discuss the theory of “nuclear 
deterrence.” While Ramsey does acknowledge that there is truth in the 
pacifist’s position that “in the nuclear age all forms of limited war raise 
the risk of general war, whether intended or not,” he argues against 
their belief that deterrence is morally wrong, given its inherent 
deception and implied consent to do reciprocal harm.92 He does this by 
drawing a distinction between deception and underlying intent, and 
bases this distinction on the belief that, “the intention to deceive is 
certainly a far cry from the intention to murder society, or to commit 
mutual homicide.”93
                                                          
92 Ibid., 254.  
93 Ibid., 255.  
 Although he would later waver from this position, 
The Just War nevertheless demonstrates his gallant attempt to 
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modernize the “just war” theory in the nuclear age. Again, like his 
Basic Christian Ethics and Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics, the 
argument can be made, and has been made by his detractors, that he 
never completed his objective. However, at the very least, by 
reexamining the possibility of a “just war” ethic, Ramsey furthered the 
discussion. And that, after all, is always the most desired result of the 
work of any ethicist.  
Let us finally turn our attentions to Ramsey’s work on biological 
and medical ethics, with which he primarily concerned himself during 
the 1970s. Examining such issues as birth control, abortion, genetic 
manipulation, and assisted suicide, Ramsey wrote prolifically 
throughout this decade. His more famous treatises on medical and 
biological ethics include Fabricated Man (1970), The Patient as Person 
(1970), The Ethics of Fetal Research (1975), Ethics at the Edges of Life 
(1978), Three on Abortion (1978), as well as dozens of articles and 
pamphlets. Again, because of the staggering quantity of his work in 
this field, only a summary of his major works and ideas may be 
presented here with enough attention to detail as to prove useful to 
the reader. Furthermore, given the commonalities of these works, a 
subject matter discussion would seem to be more desirable at this 
juncture as opposed to a chronological analysis.  
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With that in mind, let us first turn our attentions to Ramsey’s 
discussion of the bonds between human sexuality and procreation. In 
Fabricated Man, Ramsey asks, “whether sexual intercourse as an act of 
love should ever be separated from sexual intercourse as a procreative 
act?”94 Ramsey argues against what he perceives as the majority’s 
position when he states, “the fact that God joined together love and 
progeny (or the unitive and procreative purposes of sex and marriage) 
is held in honor, and not torn asunder, even when a couple for grave, 
or for what in their case is to them sufficient, reason adopt a lifelong 
policy of planned unparenthood.”95 Consequently, Ramsey then 
proceeds to voice his support of voluntary eugenics, including both 
birth control as well elective vasectomy. However, on the other side of 
the proverbial coin, Ramsey seems unwilling to give his support to 
artificial insemination because he feels that this, unlike the other forms 
of eugenic manipulation, does violate the covenant between man and 
woman and subsequently between man and God.96
                                                          
94 Paul Ramsey, Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1970), 32-3.  
95 Ibid., 34.  
96 Ibid., 34-51.  
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Let us next shift our focus to Ramsey’s writings on the issue of 
abortion. For Ramsey, this is an issue of easily definable moral 
requirements. After spending an inordinate amount of time discussing 
the various arguments about the beginnings of life, including 
implantation, segmentation, as well as fetal development, Ramsey 
then proceeds to say, “by ‘When does human life begin?’ we, of 
course, mean to ask and possibly to answer this question in the 
medical-ethical context…‘when is there human life deserving respect 
and protection like any other?’”97 Ramsey then references Harvard 
Divinity Professor Ralph Potter, who stated, “The fetus symbolizes you 
and me and our tenuous hold upon a future here at the mercy of our 
fellow men.”98
                                                          
97 Paul Ramsey, The Essential Paul Ramsey, 165. 
98 “The Abortion Debate,” The Religious Situation 1968, ed. Dwight Culver (Boston: 
Beacon, 1968), 157.  
 Ramsey then counters the prevailing theory that the 
“breath of life” (a baby’s first breath) should remain the only factor in 
determining whether life, in fact, exists, by noting, “‘The breath of life’ 
is today taken to be the sole evidence that a woman has a child or that 
a man and a woman have become parents, while ‘the breath of life’ is 
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more and more minimized among the tests for whether that same 
child grown and now terminal is still alive.”99
Finally, let us turn our attentions to Ramsey’s work concerning 
the relationship of medical ethics to his concept of covenant. In the 
preface to his The Patient as Person, Ramsey says, “I hold that 
medical ethics is consonant with the ethics of a wider human 
community. The former is (however special) only a particular case of 
the latter.”
 
100 He goes on to say that, “To take up the questions of 
medical ethics for probing…is to engage in the greatest of joint 
ventures: the moral becoming of man.”101 Just as he had been 
unwilling to condone abortion, given the inability of the fetus to protect 
its life and its fellow man’s neighbor-love obligation to do so in its 
stead, Ramsey also argued against the use of children for medical 
research because of their inherent inability to consent.102
                                                          
99 Paul Ramsey, The Essential Paul Ramsey, 166.  
100 Paul Ramsey, The Patient as Person (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1970), xi.  
101 Ibid., xviii.  
102 Ibid., 1-17, 35-40.  
 Similarly, 
Ramsey found himself unable to condone the “death with dignity” 
theory that maintained that the decision to withhold life-sustaining 
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medication or treatment or to participate actively in another’s suicide 
could ever be morally justified. However, Ramsey closes his argument 
thusly, “Together, medical men and ethicists need most urgently to 
renew the search for a way to express both moral recoil from any 
arbitrary shortening of life, and moral recoil from any arbitrary 
prolongation of dying.”103
Although the preceding could hardly be considered an exhaustive 
analysis of Ramsey’s work, it is still enough to provide the reader with 
a basic understanding of his most important ethical theories. 
Additionally, while the reader is most likely aware that Ramsey asks 
far more questions than he answers, it is imperative to remember that 
encouraging the discussion remains the primary focus of any ethicist in 
any age. In that respect, notwithstanding his failure to organize his 
ethical treatises into a system of “exceptionless principles,” as had 
always been his fervent hope, Ramsey’s work on the political, social, 
and medical problems of the twentieth century more than warrants his 
place as one of the greatest and most probing minds of the last 
hundred years. Although criticized for the inconsistencies of his 
 This call to “renew the search” arguably 
remains Ramsey’s greatest contribution not only to medical ethics, but 
to ethics in general.  
                                                          
103 Ibid., 156.  
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thought throughout the course of his career, Ramsey’s work is still 
important because it is representative of the edification process that all 
men must go through if ever they are to achieve the greatest version 
of themselves. Whether Ramsey ever reached this personal summit is 
irrelevant. Instead, what is important is that he marked his path 
sufficiently well so that others may follow his lead.   
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CHAPTER 4 
A THEOLOGY FOR THE MODERN WORLD 
 
Now that substantial effort has been made to provide the reader 
with sufficient insight into the lives and works of both Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer and Paul Ramsey, a more thorough theological analysis can 
begin. Although any number of theological and ethical issues could be 
examined through the lenses of these two remarkable Christian 
thinkers, for the purposes of this essay I have chosen only three. First, 
I analyze each man’s view of the secularization process that society 
has undergone in the modern era. While both men do acknowledge 
that such a process has occurred, and is in fact still occurring, they 
feel very differently about its impact upon the Church. Bonhoeffer, 
because of his simplistic and worldly view of both Christ and the 
Church, believes that secularization is not something to fear but rather 
something to embrace. On the other hand, Ramsey, whose views on 
ethics and Church dogma are far more traditional, views this 
secularization as responsible for the moral decline of western society. 
He argues that only by rejecting the strictly secular and returning to 
the spiritual realm for guidance can humanity begin to solve the 
problems it now faces. While I do tend to agree more with 
Bonhoeffer’s view on this particular issue, I do believe that Ramsey’s 
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arguments do hold some merit. I believe that societal secularization, in 
the wake of scientific, technological, and sociological progress, is 
inevitable, and therefore pointless to oppose. However, I also think 
that secularization left untempered by the deliberation of tradition can 
potentially change too much too quickly and perhaps take not only 
religion out of the proverbial equation but God as well. Therefore, 
while I believe that on this particular issue Bonhoeffer’s view is the 
view of the future, I think it must be examined through the lens of 
more traditional thought, such as Ramsey’s, so as to ensure that the 
Church is able to accept and embrace these societal changes in a 
manner that allows it to remain an integral part of that society and not 
another become casualty of “progress.” 
 Secondly, I examine the Church’s “just war” theory as evidenced 
by the lives and writings of both men and as it relates to the modern 
forms of warfare. As has already been stated, both men began their 
professional careers as pacifists. And although both men eventually 
changed their views on this issue, neither man truly ever lost his 
affinity for non-violence. For Bonhoeffer, his theology and his life 
ultimately became so entwined as to be indistinguishable from one 
another. Although Ramsey’s experiences were far more academic than 
Bonhoeffer’s, both men inevitably discovered that while pacifism is 
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undoubtedly one of the most Christ-like behaviors any Christian might 
exhibit, pacifism as political policy is simply unsustainable. Bonhoeffer 
realized this at the peril of his Church, and indeed his own life, at the 
hands of the Nazi regime. Ramsey realized this, from a more 
intellectual perspective, but the results were ultimately the same. And 
while both men finally came to embrace armed resistance as a 
necessary evil in the post-modern world, the nature of the resistance 
manifested itself quite differently in the lives and works of each man. 
Again, while my views on this issue more closely coincide with those of 
Bonhoeffer, I cannot ignore the significance of Ramsey’s treatises on 
the subject for they delve more deeply into the substrata of human 
conflict than any theologian before or since. For Bonhoeffer, resistance 
took on something of an individualistic nature, while for Ramsey 
resistance became a far more methodical and calculating process; not 
surprising, I suppose, given their respective views on theology in 
general. 
Finally, I examine what I believe to be at the heart of each 
man’s theological argument: structure. For Bonhoeffer, the use of 
reason and the example of Jesus Christ were sufficient tools in the 
moral decision-making process. As a result, he has been labeled by 
both friend and foe as a “situationalist.” Ramsey, however, believed 
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that by understanding the basis of God’s love for others, a more 
concrete Christian ethic could be ascertained and followed. 
Consequently, he is thought to represent the opposite end of the 
theological spectrum in this regard. After briefly outlining, and perhaps 
reiterating, the basic ethical and theological constructs of both men, I 
hope to demonstrate that this characterization is not only 
misrepresentative, but also that the theologies are in fact much closer 
to one another in both action and in theory than either man would 
probably care to admit. 
Ultimately, what I hope to demonstrate is not that one man’s 
views on theology and ethics should hold more sway over society in 
the coming generations, but rather that both men had as the essence 
of their arguments the same basic concepts and constructs. And rather 
than drawing a line in the sand and declaring our allegiance to one 
man or the other, we might realize that such a line no more separates 
the fundamental nature of our convictions than it does the spirit of our 
faith.  
Religionless Christianity 
 
 It has already been shown that Bonhoeffer believed that the 
Church is simply Christ existing as community, and therefore not 
subject to the restrictions placed upon it by any one particular 
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denomination.104 Consequently, “what matters in the Church is not 
religion but the form of Christ, and its taking form amidst a band of 
men. If we allow ourselves to lose sight of this, even for an instant, we 
inevitably relapse into that programme-planning for the ethical or 
religious shaping of the world, which was where we set out from.”105
The same holds true of the distinction which has been drawn by     
Reinhold Niebuhr, the American philosopher of religion, in his use 
of the two concepts ‘moral man’ and ‘immoral society’. The 
distinction which is intended here between individual and society 
is a purely abstract one, just as that between the person and 
work. In such a case one is tearing asunder things which are 
inseparable and examining separately parts which in isolation 
 
This line of thought, essential to his “situationalist” ethic, is also 
fundamental to his concept of secularization. Bonhoeffer argued that 
ethicists’ greatest failure in their warning against the dangers of 
secularization stems from their own inability to see the world in its 
totality. By insisting that the world is somehow divided between the 
natural and the divine, the spiritual and the secular, ethicists have 
missed the essence of Christ and of Christianity because they failed to 
recognize the inherent correlation between them. Nowhere is this 
better demonstrated than in Bonhoeffer’s critique of one of Ramsey’s 
greatest theological influences, Reinhold Niebuhr.  
                                                          
104 Robertson, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 13.  
105 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 21.  
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from each other, are dead. The consequence is that complete 
ethical aporia which nowadays goes by the name of ‘social 
ethics’.106
That is why, for Bonhoeffer, secularization is not something to be 
feared by the Church, but instead a process to be embraced and 
treasured. Because of his belief in the presence of God in all worldly 
things, secularization, while not religious in the strictest sense of the 
word, does in fact possess a spiritual quality. Rather than condemn 
science, technology, literature, and popular culture as symptomatic of 
society’s moral decline, Bonhoeffer believed the Church should strive 
to see God’s will in all things and to broaden its message of Christian 
love and brotherhood to encompass such worldly endeavors in the 
hopes of better understanding the totality of God’s love in our lives. 
“The world, the natural, the profane and reason are now all taken up 
into God from the outset. They do not exist ‘in themselves’ and ‘on 
their own account’. They have their reality nowhere save in the reality 
of God, in Christ. It is now essential to the real concept of the secular 
that it shall always be seen in the movement of being accepted by God 
in Christ.”
  
107
                                                          
106 Ibid., 58.  
107 Ibid., 64-5.   
 In other words, the task of the Christian is not to 
separate the world into spheres of secular and spiritual but to 
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understand that such a separation invalidates the true purpose of 
Christianity. “His worldliness does not divide him from Christ, and his 
Christianity does not divide him from the world. Belonging wholly to 
Christ, he stands at the same time wholly in the world.”108 Therefore, 
embrace the world. Embrace its changes. Only by doing so can the 
Church ever fully embrace the message of Christ. Bonhoeffer believed 
that this was absolutely essential if the Church is to survive in the 
modern age, which he believed it must if ever we are to achieve divine 
salvation. “The renewal of the western world lies solely in the divine 
renewal of the Church, which leads her to the fellowship of the risen 
and living Jesus Christ.”109
                                                          
108 Ibid., 67.   
109 Ibid., 52.  
 But this renewal is not to be a return to 
dogmatic traditions and a renunciation of contemporary trends and 
technologies, but rather a coexistence of the two in such a way that 
both may prosper and become more complete versions of themselves 
as a result. Bonhoeffer notes how it is only in the western world where 
science and religion are always seen to be at odds with one another. 
In Asia and the Middle East, for example, science and technology 
continue to serve the will of “God.” This is not a weakness of their 
cultures but a great strength. Because these societies and the religions 
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within them recognize the inherent spirituality of such enterprises, 
they do not feel threatened by or in competition with one another. If 
western society would only follow that lead, maybe not science and 
religion, but certainly science and God, might once more be seen as 
complementary, not contradictory. Even more hopeful, he believed he 
was beginning to witness such a trend. “Justice, truth, science, art, 
culture, humanity, liberty, patriotism, all at last, after long straying 
from the path, are once more finding their way back to the fountain-
head.”110
Secular Crisis 
 This return to the fountain-head, as he called it, was not the 
result on the Church turning inwardly and shunning the outside world, 
but rather by embracing that world and reclaiming it for Christ.  
 
  I am one who believes that the Church has more to witness to, 
more to say, than to itself or by cultivating its own inner life for 
Christ’s sake or for witness. The Church should not of itself cease 
to influence public policy having grave moral import for its own 
members and for the community at large. It ought not to seek to 
have such influence no longer, nor should it avoid what little it 
may still have or void what it may yet regain in God’s afflictive 
and overruling providence.111
This statement alone is almost sufficient to summarize Ramsey’s views 
on what he deemed the modern-day secular crisis in western society. 
  
                                                          
110 Ibid., 45.  
111 Paul Ramsey, Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism, 127.  
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Unlike Bonhoeffer, who believed the Church should acquiesce itself to 
this secularization and assume a position of lesser prominence within 
the culture at large, Ramsey argued that the Church must remain at 
the center of human civilization. Otherwise, “Moral perspectives 
emergent from the Gospel will be replaced by what’s ‘preachable’ or 
can gain a hearing today. This way lies apostasy, new versions of 
‘culture Christianity,’ and, instead of the church, a web of 
organizations still called ‘churches’ and ‘Christian’ that bear no 
resemblance to past visible communities having the same names.”112
‘Denominations’ once rightly supposed they were relevant, and 
they were generally acknowledged by others to be relevant, on 
public questions…Those days are gone forever, all of them. Some 
of us were at the bedside when God culturally died; he passed 
away so slowly it was hardly noticed. Many now say they have no 
regrets over his passing, only freedom at last. Some of us may 
  
In other words, while I believe Ramsey would have 
acknowledged the potential for seeing God in all things as Bonhoeffer 
claimed, he would have argued that without the Church to mediate the 
balance between the secular and the spiritual, God could quite easily 
become lost in the shuffle. In fact, Ramsey feared that God had 
potentially already been made culturally irrelevant in the “new” 
society.  
                                                          
112 Ibid., 127.  
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have helped to kill that god. And a few (formerly the most 
faithful) continue to stab at Christ’s cultural embodiments here 
and there, attempting desperately to render humankind better 
than in the Christian ages.113
Making a direct reference to Bonhoeffer, Ramsey states, “After 
three centuries in which every revival of Protestant Christianity has 
revived less of it, and after the recent decades of an increasingly 
Christ-less religiousness in the churches, it was predictable that 
celebrated theologians would begin their futile search for a religion-
less Christianity to proclaim in a secular world that is supposed to have 
‘come of age’.”
  
114
                                                          
113 Ibid., 126.  
114 Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics, 50.  
 Therefore, rather than embracing this secularization 
as inevitable as Bonhoeffer does, Ramsey believes the Church must 
hold to its traditions and to the doctrine that has sustained it 
throughout the centuries. By abandoning those traditions in an effort 
to amend itself for the modern world, Ramsey believes the Church 
would be effectively selling its soul. The Church, he believed, cannot 
secularize without losing something of itself in the process. “Surely it is 
not mean-spirited or anti-clerical for me to suggest that many people, 
both in and outside the churches in this secular age, do not 
understand ‘the signs of the times’ in context with the sense of 
approaching Presence it has in the Scripture. Thus only when 
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interpreted in the light of the Gospel do the signs of the times give 
grounds for hope.”115
 Because of the Church’s inability to recognize that its 
secularization would ultimately mean its demise, Ramsey argues that 
the Church must once more attempt to separate itself from the world 
in order to remain a viable entity within it. He states that, “Roman 
Catholicism, which has its roots in medievalism, seems today in a 
pluralistic society better able to distinguish the church herself from the 
state, and seems to have greater respect for the integrity of the public 
realm and for the office of political prudence.”
  
116
So I say we need to continue to try to design the ecclesial 
procedures that will release that voice, drill again for the 
substance of Christian practice that can be the church (and not 
other voices) speaking to itself and to the world concerning justice 
and the common life. This search of mine for the authentic voice 
of the church speaking for the church to the church and to the 
world of today on public questions comes, as I said, not from any 
particular view of political society, but from within my 
 This, he argues, is 
precisely what the Protestant Churches must do if they are to survive 
the secular crisis: distinguish themselves from the states. Only by 
separating itself once more from the world can the Church rediscover 
its place and purpose within it.  
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understanding of the Christian community of pilgrimage through 
many ages, times, and political systems.117
Conclusion 
  
 
“We live in a post-liberal, post-idealist, atomic age in theology. 
Philosophy and theology alike are being compelled to face their 
traditional problems in such a radical way that the question even 
arises: are our traditional problems the real ones?”118
Ramsey would also argue that the Church has sacrificed too 
much already and cannot hope to sustain itself should it continue to 
mold itself after secular trends. “Protestant ethics points every which 
way in search of the useful and prudent thing to do. We call by the 
 To this question, 
I believe both Bonhoeffer and Ramsey would have answered no. But I 
believe there is an underlying difference in their responses. For 
Bonhoeffer, if traditional problems are no longer the real ones, then 
why must the Church cling to tradition to solve the challenges it now 
faces? For Ramsey, while traditional problems may no longer be the 
real ones, it was the Church’s traditions that sustained it in past crises 
and it is these same traditions that will sustain it in its present 
predicament.  
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name of ‘social ethics’ our wanderings over the wasteland of utility 
since the day we completely surrendered to technically political reason 
the choice of the way to the goals we seek.”119
Pacifism 
 Bonhoeffer would 
counter, and I would agree, that the Church’s realization that 
everything in this world, by its very existence, is spiritual and not 
secular is sufficient grounds for the advancement of religion beyond 
doctrine and dogma. Rather than cling to tradition in the modern age, 
the Church must embrace this world in its current form and realize 
that to ever truly fade from prominence within it is not a loss for the 
Church, but a triumph for the world. Secularization is not the loss of 
morality at the expense of the Church but the advancement of society 
(beyond the need for institutional morality) for the benefit of Christ. 
Rather than reverse this trend, Ramsey and those like him, must seek 
to temper the transition from the institutional Church to the worldly 
Church to ensure that the best characteristics of the institution survive 
into the new age of the world to shape its development.  
 
[Because it has already been noted that both Bonhoeffer and 
Ramsey began their careers are ardent pacifists, and because 
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sufficient attention has already been paid to Ramsey is this regard, 
this section will deal primarily with Bonhoeffer’s thoughts on the 
matter as they relate to his arguments against justified Christian 
warfare.] Bonhoeffer’s early adherence to pacifism is best exhibited in 
his treatise, The Cost of Discipleship, in which he notes, “The right way 
to requite evil, according to Jesus, is not to resist it.”120 Instead, like 
Christ, we must willingly endure it. “The only way to overcome evil is 
to let it run itself to a standstill because it does not find the resistance 
it is looking for…when evil meets no opposition and encounters no 
obstacle but only patient endurance, its sting is drawn, and at last it 
meets an opponent which is more than its match.”121
When a man unjustly demands that I should give him my coat, I 
offer him my cloak also, and so counter his demand; when he 
requires me to go the other mile, I go willingly and show up his 
exploitation of my service for what it is. To leave everything 
behind at the call of Christ is to be content with him alone, and to 
follow only him. By his willingly renouncing self-defense, the 
Christian affirms his absolute adherence to Jesus…the 
exclusiveness of this adherence is the only power which can 
overcome evil.
 Bonhoeffer 
believed this was the only way to truly defeat evil. Paraphrasing one of 
Jesus’ own parables, he states:  
122
                                                          
120 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, 127.  
121 Ibid.   
122 Ibid., 127-8.  
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 However, Bonhoeffer does note that others have interpreted the 
scriptures somewhat differently. His discussion on “the Reformers” is 
of particular interest here. The Reformers, like Ramsey, made a 
distinction between personal suffering and the suffering of others in 
the service of Christ. They argued that while it is indeed Christian to 
endure personal suffering in the face of injustice, it is wholly 
unchristian to tolerate the suffering of others when the ability to 
intercede exists. They argued that “if we want to act in a genuine spirit 
of love we must do the very opposite, and meet force with force in 
order to check the assault of evil.”123 Upon this principle, the 
Reformers have been able to rationalize warfare and justify other 
forms of divine retribution in a Christian context. However, Bonhoeffer 
then posits what he believes to be the central flaw in their logic: 
“[Jesus] addresses his disciples as men who have left all to follow him, 
and the precept of non-violence applies equally to private life and 
official duty.”124
                                                          
123 Ibid., 128. 
124 Ibid., 129.  
 In other words, attempting to distinguish between the 
public and private aspects of Christian life is to relegate Christ to only 
one aspect or the other and thus to diminish his overall significance. 
Instead, Bonhoeffer would argue that, as Christians, we must be 
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willing to accept and endure suffering not only as private individuals, 
but also as a community of believers in Jesus Christ. Only by 
collectively sharing in this suffering and by denying the right of 
retributive justice in all its forms can the Christian, and therefore the 
Church, ever truly conquer the forces of evil.  
  Although Bonhoeffer’s views on pacifism would change with the 
rise of the Third Reich in Germany, his hope for world peace remained 
constant. During his first trip to America in 1930, Bonhoeffer said: 
 As a Christian minister I think that just here is one of the 
greatest tasks for our church: to strengthen the work of peace in 
every country and in the whole world. It must never more happen 
that a Christian people fights against a Christian people, brother 
against brother, since both have one Father…let us consider that 
the judgment comes for every man and woman, boy and girl, in 
America and Germany, in Russia and in India; and God will judge 
us according to our faith and love. How can the man who hates 
his brother expect grace from God?125
 Despite his words of warning, such a war was once more on the 
horizon. His belief in non-violence and his love for peace 
notwithstanding, Dietrich Bonhoeffer found himself caught in the midst 
of a struggle not only for political and military dominance but also for 
spiritual and social freedom. Although he has since been criticized for 
abandoning his own pacifist teachings in favor of the resistance, 
  
                                                          
125 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, No Rusty Swords, 83-4.  
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Bonhoeffer justified his actions thusly: "It is not only my task to look 
after the victims of madmen who drive a motor-car in a crowded 
street, but to do all in my power to stop their driving at all."126 Does 
this statement contradict his earlier message of pacifism? It would 
certainly appear to. But like all theologians and philosophers who are 
charged with putting their own ideas into practice, Bonhoeffer was 
forced to reexamine his positions time and again to determine if they 
still held merit for each particular circumstance. His adherence to 
“situationalism” makes such a reexamination not only possible, but 
also quite reasonable. Peace was still the ultimate goal and pacifism 
still the ultimate ideal. He merely believed that this particular situation 
called for another course of action, one that he could not forsake no 
matter the personal suffering he must endure as a result. After all, 
Bonhoeffer believed he was only following the example of the cross, 
and, “the cross is the only power in the world which proves that 
suffering love can avenge and vanquish evil.”127
 
 And while some would 
argue that makes him a martyr, Bonhoeffer would likely argue that it 
only makes him a Christian.  
                                                          
126 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, 22.  
127 Ibid., 130.  
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“Just War” 
 
“[Pacifism] teaches people to make no distinction between the 
shedding of innocent blood and the shedding of any human blood. And 
in this way pacifism has corrupted enormous numbers of people who 
will not act according to its tenets. They become convinced that a 
number of things are wicked which are not; hence, seeing no way of 
avoiding ‘wickedness,’ they set no limits to it.”128
                                                          
128 Walter Stein, Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience (London, Merlin, 1961), 56, 
as quoted in The Essential Paul Ramsey, 66.  
 Although once a 
proponent of pacifism in his youth, Ramsey spent the majority of his 
professional life attempting to refute its tenets. While he acknowledges 
early Christians’ adherence to pacifism as being in accordance with the 
teachings of Jesus Christ, he argues that their eventual adoption of the 
“just war” ethic was not so much a corruption of this teaching as a 
change in circumstance. “The primitive pacifism generally practiced by 
early Christians so long as they were in a minority giving way to what 
were judged more effective means for assuming responsibility for the 
whole of organized society…it would be a great mistake to regard 
Christianity’s accommodation to Constantine’s empire as necessarily a 
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compromise of its genius or a ‘fall’ from the pristine purity of its 
ethic.”129
Despite this position, Ramsey does admit that pacifists and “just 
war” proponents do share some common ethical ground. “The one 
thing Christian pacifists and just warriors have in common is that, if 
anything is shown to be per se a moral atrocity or to have no ‘just 
cause’ now, it should be given Christian endorsement no moment 
more.”
  
130 However, while pacifists would consider warfare to be such a 
moral atrocity, Ramsey would argue that it is, “an unavoidable 
necessity if we are not to omit to serve the needs of men in the only 
concrete way possible, and to maintain a just endurable order in which 
they may live.”131 Moreover, while pacifists would argue against the 
regard for the well-being of one neighbor over another, Ramsey would 
counter, ““Out of neighbor-regarding love for one’s fellow man, 
preferential decision among one’s neighbors may and can and should 
be made.”132
                                                          
129 William Werpehowski and Stephen D. Crocco, eds. The Essential Paul Ramsey, 49. 
130 Paul Ramsey, Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism, 63.  
131 William Werpehowski and Stephen D. Crocco, eds. The Essential Paul Ramsey, 63.  
132 Ibid., 71. 
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Because he believes conflict to be inherent in the human 
condition, and therefore the arguments about the generic morality or 
immorality of war to be irrelevant, Ramsey wishes to define the 
principles by which warfare may be conducted justly in a Christian 
context. Here again, he acknowledges the contributions of pacifism to 
the “just war” theory. “Pacifist Christians may have been wrong in the 
religious and political judgments they made in refusing direct 
participation in war; but they were certainly not wrong in discerning a 
significant distinction between civilian and combatant status…on this 
distinction hangs the discrimination between war and murder, between 
limited and unlimited war, between barely civilized and wholly 
uncivilized, even if technically efficient, military action.”133 Ramsey 
argues that it is precisely by limiting warfare that a Christian may 
participate in it justly. “Thus, a love-inspired justice going into 
concrete action fashioned rules for practical conduct – at once 
justifying war and limiting it.”134
While certain pacifists still maintain that it is the duty of the 
Christian to hate the sin but love the sinner, Ramsey argues, “The evil 
and the one who does it are in any actual situation bound so closely 
  
                                                          
133 Ibid., 81.  
134 Ibid., 71.  
82 
 
together that a person who, in one-one relationship to an enemy-
neighbor, wishes not to resist the evildoer can find no way of resisting 
evil, and a person in multilateral relationships with more than one 
neighbor who wishes for their sakes to resist evil will be unable to 
avoid resisting the evildoer as well.”135 Here, Ramsey takes the 
argument a step further, asserting that not only must the Christian 
sometimes defend one neighbor at the expense of the other; 
sometimes he must defend himself at the expense of another. “A 
Christian does what love requires, and the possibility cannot be ruled 
out that on occasion defending himself may be a duty he owes to 
others. Whenever sacrificing himself, or in any degree failing to protect 
himself and his own, actually would involve greater burdens or injury 
to others, surely then a Christian should stick to his post whether he 
wants to or not.”136
This is a break from the traditional “just war” theory of the 
Catholic tradition, but one Ramsey consciously wished to make. Only 
by asserting that no difference between private and public morality 
existed could Ramsey ever hope to demonstrate the validity of his 
claims. Because how can what is never right for the individual ever be 
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right for the nation? “Just war” is a necessary aspect of Christianity if 
the continued survival of its congregation is to be ensured. Rather 
than to shun unequivocally all use of violence, it is the duty of the 
Christian to understand the difference between morally justifiable and 
morally reprehensible courses of action. Like all of Ramsey’s ethical 
constructs, the “just war” theory is centered on the concept of faith 
working through love in the service of one’s neighbor. He would argue 
that so long as this concept remains central to the Christian’s decision-
making process, warfare is not only justifiable, but sometimes 
necessary.  
Conclusion 
 
Bonhoeffer once noted: 
It was a belief in a just, divine government of the world which 
made it possible to dispense with the perhaps effective but 
certainly un-Christian practices of killing the innocent – torture, 
extortion, and the rest. War now always remained a kind of 
appeal to the arbitration of God, which both sides were willing to 
accept. It is only when Christian faith is lost that man must 
himself make use of all means, even criminal ones, in order to 
secure by force the victory of his cause. And thus, in the place of 
a chivalrous war between Christian peoples, directed towards the 
achievement of unity in accordance with God’s judgment in 
history, there comes total war, war of destruction, in which 
everything, even crime, is justified if it serves to further our own 
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cause, and in which the enemy, whether he be armed or 
defenseless, is treated as a criminal.137
Like both Bonhoeffer and Ramsey, I would prefer to remain a 
pacifist if at all possible. But like both men, I have come to realize that 
there are circumstances in this world that make it impossible to remain 
both a Christian and a pacifist. Bonhoeffer argued, “At this point it 
becomes evident that when a Christian meets with injustice, he no 
longer clings to his rights and defends them at all costs. He is 
absolutely free from possessions and bound to Christ alone.”
  
Ramsey no doubt would agree with this statement. It is only when 
faith is lost that such action is ever possible. However, he would argue 
that what is needed is not the adherence to pacifism at the expense of 
justice, but rather faith in the principle of Christian love to dictate the 
action which that love requires.   
138
                                                          
137 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 30.  
138 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, 127.  
 
However, because Christ was “the man for others,” even to be bound 
to Christ alone is still to be bound to one another in his love. 
Therefore, while Christians can free themselves of their possessions, 
they can never free themselves from the bonds of humanity and the 
responsibilities those bonds entail.  
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“Situationalism” 
 
  “The good is no more than what is expedient, useful and 
advantageous to reality. From this it follows that there is no universal 
good but only an infinitely varying good which is determined in each 
case on the basis of ‘reality.’ This conception is undoubtedly superior 
to the idealist conception in that it is ‘closer to reality.’ Good does not 
consist here in an impossible ‘realization’ of what is unreal, the 
realization of ethical ideas. It is reality itself that teaches what is 
good.”139
 Posthumously branded by both his supporters and his detractors 
as a “situationalist,” Bonhoeffer never did concern himself with the 
formation or the formalization of a strictly Christian ethic, believing it 
to be nothing more than the idealism of theological extremists. “The 
fanatic believes that he can oppose the power of evil with the purity of 
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote these words from a Nazi prison cell 
in 1941 following his participation (albeit passively) in a failed 
assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler. While critics have insisted that 
this statement is nothing more than an attempt to justify his 
ostensibly un-Christian actions, I would argue that it is absolutely 
essential to understanding the very foundations of his theology.  
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his will and of his principle. But since it is part of the nature of 
fanaticism that it loses sight of the totality of evil and rushes like a bull 
at the red cloth instead of at the man who holds it, the fanatic 
inevitably ends by tiring and admitting defeat.”140
Certainly there is a necessary time and place in human existence 
for the so-called ‘ethical phenomenon’, that is to say the 
experience of obligation, the conscience and deliberate decision 
between something which is, on principle, good and something 
which is, on principle, evil, the ordering of life in accordance with 
a supreme standard, moral conflict and moral resolve…but the 
delimiting of the place and of the time is of crucial importance if 
one is to prevent a pathological overburdening of life by the 
ethical, if one is to prevent that abnormal fanaticization and total 
moralization of life which has at its consequence that those 
processes of concrete life which are not properly subject to 
general principles are exposed to constant criticism, fault-finding, 
admonition, correction and general interference.
 While he did 
acknowledge that certain experiences, cultural and societal traditions, 
etc., often did provide a framework within which moral decisions could 
be made, he remained reluctant to relinquish completely his use of 
reason in favor of a series of abstract principles.  
141
In other words, while Bonhoeffer acknowledged that principles 
do have their proper place in the study and practice of ethics, that 
place can never be the center. That is because, for Bonhoeffer, the 
center of Christian ethics, indeed the center of Christianity itself, must 
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always be found in the person of Jesus Christ. And, “Jesus Christ 
cannot be identified with either an ideal or standard or with things as 
they are. The hostility of the ideal towards things as they are, the 
fanatical putting into effect of an idea in the face of a resisting 
actuality, may be as remote from good as is the sacrifice of what 
should be to what is expedient.”142 Furthermore, while principles may 
have their proper place in the ethical discussion, “exceptionless 
principles” do not. “Timeless and placeless ethical discourse lacks the 
concrete warrant which all authentic ethical discourse requires. It is an 
adolescent, presumptuous and illegitimate declamation of ethical 
principles, and however intense may be the subjective earnestness 
with which it is propounded, it is contrary to the essential character of 
ethical discourse in a way which is clearly felt, even though it may be 
difficult to define.”143
Bonhoeffer’s great concern for ethicists who occupied themselves 
primarily with the formation of a set of exceptionless principles is that 
they would become so absorbed with their task that they would 
ultimately disregard the centrifugal force and central purpose of 
Christian ethics: following the example of Jesus Christ. “For indeed it is 
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not written that God became an idea, a principle, a programme, a 
universally valid proposition or a law, but that God became man.”144 
The last part of that statement is so crucial to understanding 
Bonhoeffer’s “situationalist” approach to ethics: “God became man.” 
Similar to other theologians’ arguments to “hate the sin, but love the 
sinner,” Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on God’s love for humanity as 
represented in the embodiment of His Son, Jesus Christ, is 
Bonhoeffer’s way of saying trust the humanity inside of each of us to 
live as Christ lived. Because Jesus Christ became man, embraced the 
all the challenges that entailed, and lived and died as “the man for 
others,” he and he alone must serve as our inspiration and our guide 
as we tread the waters of moral uncertainty. “Everything would be 
ruined if one were to try to reserve Christ for the Church and to allow 
the world only some kind of law, even if it were a Christian law. Christ 
died for the world, and it is only in the midst of the world that Christ is 
Christ.”145
                                                          
144 Ibid., 22.  
145 Ibid., 71.  
 In conclusion, Bonhoeffer would argue, “it is not a question 
of applying directly to the world the teaching of Christ or what are 
referred to as Christian principles, so that the world might be formed 
in accordance with these. On the contrary, formation comes only by 
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being drawn in into the form of Jesus Christ. It comes only as 
formation in His likeness, as conformation with the unique form of Him 
who was made man, was crucified, and rose again.”146
Ethical Principles 
 
 
 “A Christian cannot but rely, in deep humility, upon guiding 
rules, upon the cumulative experience of one’s own and other people’s 
obedience. It is this bank of experience which gives us our working 
rules of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ and without them we could not but 
flounder.”147
                                                          
146 Ibid., 18.  
147 Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics, 27.    
 This was Paul Ramsey’s steadfast belief. In order for the 
Christian to properly “do ethics,” one must not only avail himself of 
this bank of experience but also realize that these experiences, when 
collectively viewed and critically examined, hold the foundations for a 
system of ethical principles by which a Christian can and should live. 
Criticizing situationalism for its failure to grasp this basic truth of 
human existence, Ramsey argued that, “In fact, there can be no such 
thing as Christian social ethics, or any social ethics at all, unless there 
are practices having general validity, unless there are moral 
institutions…the crucial question in whether in morality there are only 
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tactical directives to the players. Are there not also rules of the game 
itself?”148
To continue this sports metaphor, the baseball player’s 
understanding of the rules of the game dictates that he be allowed 
three strikes per at bat. It would create innumerable problems for both 
himself and the game at large if this issue had to be reexamined for 
every player and at every at bat, claiming this player deserves four 
and this one only two. Rather, it is generally understood to be a valid 
rule that each player receives only three strikes. This continuity is not 
a weakness, but rather a strength. So, too, it is in morality. That is not 
to say that things must always continue as they are now, but rather 
that while “exceptions are not justified within the practice itself…agape 
may work to change the rules of the game.”
  
149 While Ramsey’s 
opponents might argue that this sounds a great deal like 
situationalism, if only thinly veiled, Ramsey would counter, “It is a 
common and basic error of Christian situationalism to begin with the 
premise that agape in its freedom cannot bind itself unreservedly and 
change not.”150
                                                          
148 William Werpehowski and Stephen D. Crocco, eds. The Essential Paul Ramsey, 20.  
149 Ibid., xviii.  
 “Each person is in principle always entitled to 
150 Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics, 32.  
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reconsider the correctness of a rule and to question whether it is 
proper to follow it in any particular case. This he does by making a 
fresh application of the general norm of agape to the case in point.”151
 And while Ramsey’s entire Christian ethic was founded upon the 
principle of agape, or “faith working through love,” that is not to say 
that this principle alone is sufficient to characterize his thoughts on the 
subject. Having established the primacy of love for his Christian ethic, 
Ramsey then asked, ““In addition to the standard that is distinctive 
and also primary in Christian ethics, are there any principles, or 
sources of moral wisdom, that while secondary and not distinctive are 
nevertheless necessary in a complete Christian theory of ethics?”
  
152 
Ramsey would unequivocally answer yes. “There is a shape which the 
engendered deeds take from engendering event of Christ; and the 
contours of the Christian life may be articulated in terms of certain 
rules, principles, or styles of conduct.”153
                                                          
151 Ibid., 124.  
152 Ibid., 29.  
153 Ibid., 125.  
 Just because obedient love 
for one’s neighbor is central to this system of ethical principles does 
not mean it is the only criterion for decision-making within the system. 
That, too, would be situationalism. Rather, Ramsey argues that, “The 
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ethics of Paul, indeed Christian ethics generally, seems always in peril 
of opening the floodgates of anarchy and license in the name of 
freedom from the law…”154
 In place of rules for conduct, instead of ‘the law’ which 
Christianity entirely finishes, comes not irregularity, but self-
regulation, and not merely the self-regulation of free, autonomous 
individuals but the self-regulation of persons unconditionally 
bound to their neighbors by obedient ‘faith working through 
love.’…A Christian says ‘nevertheless’ and ‘in spite of this’ to 
every circumstance, persistently finding the works of love 
obligatory. The commands of love are as stringent as the needs of 
the world are urgent: sensing this, let any man then do as he 
pleases.
 However: 
155
Conclusion 
  
In other words, while love is primal, from it can be derived an entire 
system of secondary principles and constructs that, when taken 
together as a whole, can be most beneficial to the Christian in his 
efforts to live rightly and morally in today’s society.  
 
While I must admit that I was initially torn between these two 
seemingly opposite ideologies, upon closer inspection I began to 
realize how similar they truly are. Bonhoeffer argued, “It is not by 
astuteness, by knowing the tricks, but only by simple steadfastness in 
the truth of God, by training the eye upon this truth until it is simple 
                                                          
154 William Werpehowski and Stephen D. Crocco, eds. The Essential Paul Ramsey, 4. 
155 Ibid., 14.  
93 
 
and wise, that there comes the experience and the knowledge of the 
ethical reality.”156 He labeled any man who would attempt to base 
Christian ethics on exceptionless principles as an extremist, stating, 
“even if his fanaticism serves the high cause of truth or justice, he will 
sooner or later become entangled with non-essentials and petty details 
and fall into the snare set by his more skillful opponent.”157
                                                          
156 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 4.  
157 Ibid., 5.  
 Ironically, 
this is what ultimately happened to Ramsey. He never realized his 
dream of an entire system of exceptionless principles but instead only 
served to establish obedient love for one’s neighbor as the center of 
that unfinished ethic. So ultimately, for Bonhoeffer the essence of 
ethics is God’s truth. For Ramsey, it is God’s love. Personally, I cannot 
envision a circumstance when these two ideals would be in conflict 
with one another. As a result, I do not feel the need to subscribe to 
one at the expense of the other. Rather, by acknowledging that if 
Christians allow themselves to be guided by the search for truth and in 
the service of love, their actions, and consequently their lives, will be 
the better for it.  
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